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 I1How to kill a country?: The US-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, pharmaceuticals and intellectual property
In February 2004, the Australian government announced the successful 
conclusion of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. 
The  Agreement,  which  was  to  come  into  force  following  ratification  by  the 
Australian Parliament and the US Congress, was the subject of vigorous and, at 
times, highly polemical debate in Australia. Of the main issues under discussion, 
two were familiar from previous debates over trade policy.
The first issue was concerned estimates of the net economic benefits of 
the Agreement. While negotatiations were underway, a report commissioned by 
the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade  estimated  that  a  free  trade 
agreement with the United States would produce net benefits of with a present 
value of over $A15 billion (Centre for International Economics 2001)
However,  the  actual  terms  of  the  Agreement  were  considerably  less 
favorable than those anticipated by Centre for International Economics (2001). 
In particular, there was no increase in access to the US market for Australian 
sugar,  and  only  modest  improvements  for  beef.  These  were  only  the  most 
extreme  elements  of  a  generally  lopsided  deal,  in  which  the  US  maintained 
substantial barriers to Australian imports while gaining, not only the removal of 
nearly  all  traditional  trade  barriers  but  influence  over  a  wide  range  of 
Australian domestic policy institutions.
Nevertheless, a revised study by the Centre for International Economics 
(2004) estimated even larger net benefits, with a present value of $A55 billion 
over  20  years,  largely  on  the  basis  of  new,  and  heroic,  assumptions  about 
benefits from capital market integration. Independent analysis, such as that of 
Dee (2004) generated much smaller estimates, of the order of $100 million each 
year  for  the  goods  trade  component  of  the  Agreement.  Taking  account  of  the 
uncertainties  involved,  it  would  be  difficult  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that, 
assessed in terms of standard neoclassical trade theory, the costs and benefits of 
2the  Agreement  to  Australia  will  be  approximately  equal,  and  that  the  net 
benefits will be approximately equal to zero.
The  second  issue  concerned  the  relative  desirability  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral agreements. Proponents of multilateral processes, such as Garnaut 
and Carmichael (2004) were strongly critical of the Agreement, and argued that 
it  would  undermine  both  the  World  Trade  Organisation  and  prospects  for 
improved trade relationships with Asia.
Supporters  of  the  Agreement,  such  as  Austa  (2003)  argued    that  the 
failure  of  the  Cancun  round  of  WTO  negotiations  showed  that  multilateral 
processes could not be relied upon to produce progress towards freer trade or 
alternatively  that  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  were  complements 
rather  than  substitutes.  In  addition,  they  pointed  to  the  dynamic  benefits  of 
closer integration with the US economy (Oxley 2002).
These issues were familiar from past debates. However, the Agreement 
also attracted critical attention from a wide range of actors, including writers, 
health  policy  professionals  and  actors  in  the  literal  rather  than  metaphorical 
sense  of  the  term,  whose  concerns  and  interests  had  not  previously  been 
impinged upon by trade policy1. Most of these concerns were related, in one form 
or another to the issue of intellectual property2.
The  debate  over  the  Agreement  has  produced  a  book,  How  to  Kill  a 
Country,  primarily  concerned  with  intellectual  property  and  related  issues 
(Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews 2004). The polemical title of this work reflects 
the  heated  atmosphere  of  the  debate  and  also,  perhaps,  the  marketing 
requirements of a popular book on a complex issue likely to remain topical for 
only a few months. 
The authors provide a range of arguments to support the claim that, on 
3
1 Actors were concerned with provisions regarding cultural protection such as requirements for 
Australian content on television, which were the subject of an amendment to the implementing 
legislation. This issue is outside the scope of the present paper.
2 This term is widely used with the assumption that intellectual property is similar in kind to, 
say, property in land. In economic terms, however, intellectual property is ‘property’ in the same 
sense that monopoly rents are rents. balance, the Agreement will make Australians worse off, particularly in relation 
to issues such as copyright, quarantine and pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, even 
a  grossly  lopsided  trade  deal  scarcely  amounts  to  national  ruin.  Even  if  the 
Agreement  doubled  the  cost  of  the  Pharmaceutical  Benefits  Scheme,  the 
resulting  loss  to  Australia  would  be  less  than  1  per  cent  of  GDP  each  year. 
Conversely, even the overoptimistic projections of the Centre for International 
Economics (2004) yield benefits of less than 1 per cent of GDP each year. 
Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews justify their title by the claim that the 
Agreement ‘threatens the core institutions of our country, and begins a process 
where  they  will  be  relentlessly  substituted  with  the  institutions  of  a  foreign 
power’. This may sound hyperbolic, but except for the negative tone, it is not 
noticeably  different  from  Oxley’s  (2002)  description  of  the  objective  of  the 
Agreement as securing for Australia the objective of ‘comprehensive economic 
integration’ with the United States. Clearly, comprehensive economic integration 
is  not  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  radically  different  economic 
institutions, and no-one is suggesting that the Agreement will lead the United 
States to adopt Australian institutions. 
In assessing the argument pur forward by Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews, 
it is, therefore, necessary to consider two questions: First, to what extent does 
the Agreement compel Australia to adopt institutions modelled on those of the 
United States; and second, would a shift towards US institutions make us better 
or worse off ?
In  arguing  that  Australia  will  be  worse  off,  Weiss,  Thurbon  and 
Matthews examine four areas of policy: pharmaceuticals, quarantine, copyright 
and government procurement. The implications of the Agreement in these policy 
areas  forms  the  remainder  of  this  paper.  Of  the  four  issues,  pharmaceuticals 
were the most controversial in the debate over the Agreement and raised the 
most  difficult  economic  issues,  and  will  therefore  be  the  primary  focus  of 
attention.
4Pharmaceuticals
The  implementing  legislation  for  the  Agreement  was  passed  by  the 
Australian  Parliament  in  August  2004.  The  legislation  incorporated  an 
amendment,  proposed  by  the  Labor  party,  that  was  designed  to  prevent  a 
possible abuse of patent law through ‘evergreening’, a devuce by which patent-
holders may extend the effective life of patents through trivial modifications to 
existing  drugs.    It  was  feared  that  evergreening,  in  combination  with  the 
increased protection for US patent-holders provided under the Agreement, might 
reduce  the  availability  of  cheaper  generic  drugs  and  thereby  increase  the 
operation costs of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).  
The evergreening amendment was criticised vigorously, but was accepted 
when  it  attracted  strong  public  support.  The  government’s  resistance  to 
amendments  concerned  with  the  PBS  reflected  the  importance  placed  by  US 
negotiators on this issue, as did by the reaction of US officials to the amended 
legislation.
Although previously enthusiastic about the Agreement, representatives of 
the  US  government  were  strongly  critical  of  the  amended  legislation,  and 
delayed  certification  of  the  Australian  legislation  as  implementing  the 
Agreement, a step required for the Agreement to come into force. This resistance 
is  indicative  of  the  importance  placed  by  the  US  Administration  on  the 
protection of intellectual property in pharmaceuticals and the perceived threat to 
intellectual  property  posed  by  interventions  such  as  the  PBS.  US  and  other 
pharmaceutical companies have long been critical of the PBS, claiming that it 
does  not  provide  an  adequate  return  for  the  investment  in  research  and 
development  required  to  develop  new  drugs.  Conversely,  the  debate  over  the 
Agreement in Australia highlighted the importance placed by political actors and 
the public on the preservation of the PBS in its current form. 
It  is  unclear,  however,  that  the  amended  Agreement  is  a  sustainable 
basis for maintenance of the PBS. Pearson (2004), in criticising the evergreening 
amendment, observes that it may be contrary to the Agreement in a number of 
5respects. First, he says, the amendment may conflict with terms in the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement that preclude 
discriminatory treatment of a specific sector such as pharmaceuticals. Second, 
there  are general clauses in the Agreement that require ‘standstill’ in measures 
that would affect the relative positions of the parties. Third, US pharmaceutical 
companies  might  claim  that  they  are  being  denied  the  ‘reasonable  benefits’ 
available to them under the Agreement. Pearson argues that the effectiveness of 
the amendment could be annulled by an exchange of letters between the United 
States and Australia, binding the Australian government not to act against the 
interests of US pharmaceutical companies.
It is important to observe that these points have nothing to do with the 
specific content of Labor’s amendment. They apply to any legislation concerning 
the PBS that an Australian government might seek to introduce in the future 
and, arguably, to any administrative decisions made by the government.  That is, 
on Pearson’s analysis, the Agreement gives the United States an effective veto 
power  over  any  changes  made  by  an  Australian  government  to  improve  the 
functioning of the PBS, at least if these can be argued to harm the position of US 
pharmaceutical suppliers. 
Weiss,  Thurbon  and  Matthews  (2004)  develop  these  concerns  with 
detailed  reference  to  the  review  and  transparency  procedures  set  out  in  the 
Agreement. Their conclusion, which appears plausible, is  that the PBS will not 
be sustainable in the long term, in view of the pressure that can be applied  by 
US pharmaceutical companies under the terms of the Agreement.
In these circumstances, it is important to consider whether the PBS is an 
appropriate method of financing research and innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector. Although it has been an important element of Australian health policy 
since its establishment, more than fifty years ago under the National Health Act 
1953  (Cwlth),  the  PBS  has  rarely  been  critically  examined  or  rigorously 
defended.Hence, before examining the Agreement it is necessary to consider the 
general question - how should we pay for pharmaceutical research ? 
6How should we pay for pharmaceutical research ?
There  is  no  dispute  about  the  proposition  that  the  producers  of 
pharmaceuticals should receive payments sufficient to cover the marginal cost of 
production. Hence, the main issue is that of determining how society should pay 
for the medical research that is required to produce new pharmaceuticals. 
In  an  economy  based  primarily  on  market  production,  it  is  natural  to 
start  by  looking  at  the  free-market  solution.  In  the  absence  of  government 
intervention,  firms  innovate  in  the  hope  of  securing  above-normal  profits  by 
offering a superior product. They discourage imitators using a variety of methods 
such as branding and trade secrecy. 
Such methods will not protect a valuable innovation forever, but in some 
cases  they  deliver  enough  profits  to  finance  a  satisfactory  rate  of  innovation. 
Examples  include  industries  where  innovation  is  focused  on  keeping  up  with 
rapidly changing consumer tastes, such as the fashion industry.
There are, however, good reasons to suppose that free markets will not 
deliver adequate levels of innovation in pharmaceuticals. The cumulative nature 
of scientific knowledge means that reliance on trade secrecy is neither feasible 
nor  socially  desirable.  Branding  has  some  effects,  but  the  success  of  generic 
substitutes for branded products indicates that only modest price margins can be 
maintained through branding. Moreover, there is no guarantee that innovators 
will be more successful than imitators in building up brand identity. 
To finance adequate levels of medical research, therefore, some form of 
government intervention is necessary. There are three main options:
•  patents;
•  research grants; and
•  research rewards.
Patents
Of  these  options,  patents  involve  the  most  intrusive  government 
intervention  and  the  largest  welfare  costs.  A  patent  is  a  temporary  grant  of 
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and market goods that are inconsistent with the terms of the patent. Since a 
monopoly  is  analogous  to  a  narrowly-based  consumption  tax,  it  has  higher 
welfare costs than an equivalent sum raised from general taxes.
 On the other hand, if the product market in question functions well in 
other respects (in particular, if consumers are well-informed and there are no 
cross-subsidies), the profit from the monopoly is a good measure of the social 
value  of  the  innovation,  eliminating  the  need  for  governments  to  make 
judgements on this issue. 
The problem in the case of pharmaceuticals is that the conditions for an 
efficient  product  market  are  not  met.  Consumers  are  largely  reliant  on  the 
advice of doctors, who face a range of incentives that are unrelated to the social 
costs and benefits of alternative options. In general, medical ethics encourage 
doctors  to  seek  the  most  effective  treatment,  without  regard  to  costs. 
Institutional  incentives  modify  this  position,  but  often  in  ways  that  promote 
excessive intervention. For example, the risk of malpractice litigation may lead 
doctors to practise ‘defensive medicine’, prescribing tests and antibiotics even in 
cases where they are unlikely to be beneficial.
More  generally,  patients  face  cross-subsidies  of  various  kinds,  for 
example arising from public and private insurance. Patients are likely to bear 
the full cost of non-prescription medicines, which are relatively cheap, to make 
only partial payments for prescriptions filled by pharmacies and (at least in the 
case  of  public  inpatients)  to  pay  nothing  for  medicine  supplied  in  hospitals. 
Hence, their patterns of demand indicate little about social costs and benefits.
Research grants
Research  grants  of  various  kinds  are  the  basis  of  most  fundamental 
research. This category includes both project-based grants of the kind funded by 
national medical research agencies and the funding of universities and research 
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3  Historically, the grant of patents on items such as salt and playing cards first emerged  under the 
Tudor and Stuart monarchies in the late 16th century  as a device for raising revenue and rewarding 
favourites. The award of patents as a reward for inventors came much later. institutes to undertake research without specific directions as to the content of 
that research. 
The most important benefit of grant-based research, is that the products 
of research are freely available. Since the optimal price for a pure public good is 
zero, a grant-based system achieves ex post efficiency.4
Since  research  grants  are  funded  from  general  revenue,  there  is  an 
associated  deadweight  loss,  equal  to  the  marginal  social  cost  of  tax  revenue. 
Estimates of this deadweight cost vary widely, from near zero to 50 cents per 
dollar  of  additional  revenue.  Note  that  the  marginal  cost  of  general  revenue, 
which is the cost associated with the most efficient available source of additional 
revenue, cannot be greater than the marginal cost of revenue from a narrowly-
based  tax  or  tax  equivalent,  such  as  the  monopoly  profit  associated  with  a 
patent. 
The main problem with a grant-based model is the need for governments 
to  make  judgements  about  which  projects  or  researchers  to  support.  This  is 
normally done through processes of peer review.  Such processes appear to do a 
fairly good job of identifying the best performers in established lines of inquiry. 
However, they are less satisfactory in providing support for new and innovative 
lines  of  research,  particularly  if  these  are  not  undertaken  within  established 
institutions such as universities and research institutes.
Research rewards
The least familiar category of support for innovation is that of rewards for 
successful research. A famous historical instance is that of the Longitude prize, 
awarded by the British government for the invention of a workable method of 
determining longitude at sea (Sobel 1996). Explicit prizes of this kind are rare 
nowadays and are mostly privately funded. A recent example is the Kremer prize 
for human-powered flight, won by MacCready in 1977 with the Gossamer Condor 
9
4 In recent times, some grant-funded researchers and institutions have sought a ‘second bite at 
the cherry’ through patents. This is an undesirable development, which, if it became the norm, 
would  undermine  the  public-good  character  of  grant-funded  research.  However,  the  amount 
actually raised in this way is smaller than is commonly imagined, and the public-good character 
of grant-funded research remains largely intact.(National Air and Space Museum 2000).
But in practice, research grants are awarded, at least in part, as a reward 
for past successes. More importantly, for the purposes of the present argument, 
the Australian system of purchasing pharmaceuticals is, in essence, a reward-
based system. Pharmaceutical companies with new and innovative products offer 
them to the Australian government, which accepts them if the estimated social 
benefit of the drug exceeds the price demanded. 5 For a bargain to be struck, the 
price  must  be  somewhere  between  the  company's  marginal  cost  and  the  net 
benefit to Australia. Where there is a wide gap, a standard bargaining problem 
arises, with the buyer seeking a price near the lower bound and the seller a price 
near the upper bound.
Because Australia is a small market, companies can cover most of their 
fixed costs in other markets such as the US, so that the marginal cost may be 
quite low. This strengthens Australia's bargaining position. On the other hand, 
the fact that fixed costs have already been covered means that companies can 
credibly threaten to withhold drugs from the Australian market if the payment 
is  inadequate.  In  a  game  with  repeated  interactions,  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose that prices will inevitably be driven down to marginal costs.
It  might  be  expected  that  a  threat  to  withhold  supply  would  be  more 
credible in the case of an innovative drug offering substantial benefits, and the 
evidence  appears  to  be  consistent  with  this  prediction.    The  Productivity 
Commission  (2001)  found  that  the  price  differences  vary  across  classes  of 
pharmaceuticals.  Australian prices for new and innovative pharmaceuticals are 
much closer to those in other countries than prices for “me-too” pharmaceuticals 
(patented drugs similar in function to those previously patented by competitors) 
and generic drugs, for which patent protection has expired.
On balance, it seems likely that the availability of monopoly profits in the 
US market reduces the equilibrium price in bargains between pharmaceutical 
10
5 The operation of the rewards-based system presupposes that companies have patent rights, 
since otherwise Australia could simply produce the drug independently. Under the TRIPS 
agreement this option is available to poor countries, but not to developed countries like Australia.companies  and  the  Australian  PBS.  But  the  magnitude  of  this  effect  is 
considerably smaller than the difference between Australian and US drug prices. 
US  prices  inflated  by  factors  such  as  expenditure  on  advertising6,  and  the 
incentives provided by the US system for the production of ‘me-too’ drugs.
It seems likely that, if the United States adopted a system similar to the 
PBS,    there  would  be  some  increase  in  the  equilibrium  price  for  Australia. 
However,  the  improved  incentives  for  the  allocation  of  research  effort  would 
produce a significant increase in global welfare, relative to a system driven by 
monopoly profits on patents.
Quarantine
The provisions of the Agreement with respect to quarantine are similar 
in broad terms to those with respect to pharmaceuticals. That is, they provide   
the United States with consultation rights that have been represented by the 
Australian government as implying no change to Australia’s existing procedures, 
but which were nevertheless seen by the US negotiators as being of substantial 
significance.  In  principle,  the  quarantine  provisions  of  the  Agreement  are 
symmetrical, giving similar consultation rights to Australia.
Quarantine policy involves trading off gains from trade in agricultural 
products against the risks to human health and domestic agricultural production 
from  the  importation  of  exotic  pests  and  diseases.    The  political  economy  of 
quarantine is complicated by the fact that the domestic producers who benefit 
from a lower risk of disease also benefit from the protection against competition 
arising from restrictions on imports. 
Hence, domestic producers have an interest in lobbying for quarantine 
restrictions regardless of the balance of costs and benefits to the nation as a 
whole. Conversely, advocates of freer trade have frequently looked at quarantine 
restrictions with suspicion.
In  principle,  the  problem  could  be  addressed  using  the  tools  of  risk 
analysis.  In  most  cases,  however,  information  on  the  probabilities  associated 
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6  The United States is the only major jurisdiction that permits advertising of pharmaceuticals to 
consumers with various adverse outcomes is unavailable, or too fragile to form a basis for 
agreement on policy responses. As a result, less formal approaches have been 
adopted. 
As Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews (2004) observe, Australia’s existing 
quarantine procedures have been approved by the World Trade Organisation, 
under assessment processes that imply a presumption in favour of free trade. In 
the absence of a well-developed formal basis for risk analysis, the inclusion of the 
additional  consultation  mechanisms  proposed  in  the  Agreement  implies  that 
quarantine policy will give a higher weight to gains from trade than previously, 
and  will  give  a  correspondingly  lower  weight  to  concerns  about  disease  and 
health.
Given  the  difficulty  of  assessing  quarantine  issues  on  a  case-by-case 
basis, it seems reasonable to ask whether, in aggregate, quarantine and other 
phytosanitary restrictions appear to be in need of adjustment and, if so, in what 
direction.  The  most  important  recent  failure  of  such  restrictions  has  been 
associated with bovine spongiform encephelopathy (BSE or ‘mad cow disease’) 
and  the  resulting  transmission  to  humans  of  Creutzfeld–Jakob  disease  (CJD) 
which  is  estimated  to  have  caused  more  than  100  fatalities  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  UK  had  earlier  suffered  from  an  outbreak  of  foot-and-mouth 
disease,  triggering  restrictions  on  movement  that  gravely  affected  the  tourist 
industry.  Barks-Ruggles  (2001)  reports  that  direct  financial  costs  of  the  BSE 
epidemic are estimated to have exceeded 1.5 billion pounds, mostly associated 
with the slaughter of cattle at risk of infection, while the cost of the foot and 
mouth outbreak exceeded 5 billion pounds.
The emergence and spread of BSE has been associated with a range of 
innovations including the feeding of cattle on meal containing spinal and brain 
material  from  other  cattle,  and  the  development  of  more  complex  patterns  of 
international trade in livestock. In addition, UK health authorities clearly erred 
on the side of protecting producing interests in the early stages of the epidemic. 
A similar pattern was observed in the United States where resistance to testing 
may have facilitated the spread of BSE and the resulting loss of export markets.
12Observation of the BSE case does not support the view that quarantine 
and  phytosanitary  restrictions  are,  in  general,  excessively  strict.  There  may, 
however, be individual cases where the opposite is true. For example, Anderson 
and James (1998) argue that, even if imported diseases were to wipe out the 
Australian banana industry, the gains to consumers from cheaper imports would 
outweigh  the  losses  to  import-competing  producers.  On  balance,  however,  it 
seems unlikely that using trade negotiations as a basis for reforming quarantine 
policy is likely to achieve an optimal trade-off between the benefits of freer trade 
and the costs of disease risks. 
Copyright
Prior to the signing of the Agreement, Australia had one of the world’s 
most  liberal  copyright  regimes,  with  copyright  extending  a  ‘mere’  fifty  years 
beyond the author’s death compared to seventy years in the European Union, 
and ninety-nine years in the United States. All of these terms are substantially 
longer  than  those  prevailing  when  the  first  systematic  copyright  laws  were 
introduced in Britain and the United States during the 18th century.
As  part  of  the  Agreement,  Australia  agreed  to  adopt  a  minimum 
copyright  term  of  seventy  years.  And,  as  is  par  for  the  course  with  the 
Agreement, there was no corresponding concession on the US side, not even a 
standstill provision. There is nothing to stop the United States from extending 
the term of copyright indefinitely, and every reason to suppose, based on the 
current balance of lobbying power, that it will do so, and that it will pressure 
Australia and others to follow. 
It is hard to see any economic justification for a copyright term extending 
even fifty years beyond the author’s death. For the vast majority of authors, the 
residual value of copyright is exhausted within a few years of publication. But 
even  for  the  remaining  minority,  the  incentive  effect  of  a  low-probability 
financial payoff to be received by their heirs more than fifty years after their 
deaths must be trivially small in nearly every case.
Of course, for the corporate owners of properties like Winnie the Pooh and 
13Mickey Mouse, both of whom are at or near the relevant expiry dates, the rent 
associated  with  an  extension  of  the  copyright  term  is  huge.  It  is  unclear, 
however,  why  trade  mark  protection  could  not  be  an  adequate  substitute  for 
copyright, at least as far as merchandise is concerned.
Obviously the extension of copyright terms has a static monopoly cost, 
similar  to  that  of  patents.  A  more  fundamental  concern,  however,  is  the 
disincentive to the free dissemination of ideas.  Large numbers of works are out 
of  print,  with  copyright  owners  who  are  untraceable.  Attempts  to  provide 
systematic  access  to  large  bodies  of  knowledge  are  regularly  obstructed  by 
copyright difficulties. 
It  was  for  these  reasons  that  a  diverse  group  of  economists,  including 
Kenneth  Arrow,  James  Buchanan,  Ronald  Coase  and  Milton  Friedman 
submitted an amicus curiae (friends of the court) brief to the US Supreme Court 
(Arrow  et  al.  2002)  in  the  case  of  Eldred  v  Ashcroft  in  support  of  an 
(unsuccessful)  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  Sonny  Bono  Copyright 
Term Extension Act, which added 20 years to existing and future copyrights. The 
issues have been discussed most extensively by Lessig (1999, 2001).
Like Lessig, Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews (2004) place the debate over 
copyright  in  the  broader  context  of  attempts,  pursued  most  vigorously  in  the 
United States, to give the monopoly rights commonly referred to as ‘intellectual 
property’, all the civil and physical protection associated with property rights in 
real  and  financial  assets,  with  no  regard  to  the  public  good  nature  of 
information.  The  issues  involved  have  been  discussed  above  in  relation  to 
pharmaceuticals.
Government procurement
The argument made by Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews (2004) on government 
procurement is, in essence, a restatement of the general observation regarding 
trade in goods and services, that the Agreement is biased in favor of the United 
States.    For  example,  the  Agreement  allows  requirements  to  ‘set  aside’  a 
proportion of contracts for domestic small businesses. On the US side, a small 
14business is defined as having less than 1500 employees; in Australia it is less 
than 200.
On this issue, Weiss, Thurbon and Matthews do not make a strong case that 
Australian  rules  regarding  government  procurement  are  more  sensible, 
considered  in  terms  of  national  policy,  than  those  prevailing  in  the  United 
States. On the contrary, they show some sympathy for US requirements to set 
aside  a  substantial  portion  of  government  contracts  for  small  and  medium 
enterprises,  and  for  the  generally  entrenched  ‘Buy  American’  culture.  Their 
position  is  more  that,  if  the  Americans  are  going  to  continue  to  tilt  the 
procurement playing field in favor of local business, so should we.
Concluding comments
Considered purely as a trade agreement, the US–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement  would  have  been  beneficial  to  Australia  if  it  had  delivered  a 
substantial  bilateral  movement  towards  free  trade.  However,  because  the 
Agreement allows the United States to retain its most damaging trade barriers, 
the net benefits to Australia, considered purely as a trade agreement, are near 
zero and quite possibly negative.
It is the economic integration aspects of the Agreement, amounting to a 
decision by Australia to adopt the US agenda in favour of strong Intellectual 
Property rights, that is of most concern. The expansion of Intellectual Property 
rights  is  damaging  even  to  the  United  States,  which  is  a  net  exporter  of 
Intellectual Property and is even more so in the case of Australia. Threats to the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and the danger of being pushed towards some 
version of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act are of particular concern.
The  Agreement  may  not,  as  Weiss,  Thurbon  and  Matthews  (2004) 
suggest, represent a road to national ruin. But it is lopsided in its trade aspects, 
damaging  to  the  general  multilateral  trade  process  and  dangerous  in  its 
expansion  of  the  monopoly  rights  associated  with  intellectual  property.   
Australia’s  negotiators  should  not  have  signed  this  Agreement  and  the 
Australian Parliament should not have ratified it.
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